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Abstract
Purpose – This study examines the impact of two different types of foreign ownership—by Arab and non-
Arab investors on firms’ financial and social performance. It then goes on to investigate how the degree of
board independence affects the aforementioned relationship between these two types of foreign investors on
firm performance.
Design/methodology/approach – The sample for the study is a panel of all listed firms in the Dubai
Financial Market (DFM) and the Abu Dhabi Securities exchange (ADX) from 2008 to 2012.
Findings – Results indicate that while Arab foreign ownership affects firms’ financial and social performance
negatively, non-Arab foreign ownership does so, positively. Further tests indicate that board independence
weakens the negative relationship between firm financial and social performance with foreignArab ownership
and deteriorate the relationship between firm financial and social performance and non-Arab foreign
ownership.
Research limitations/implications – Future studies may extend the coverage of the study by including
other countries in the region and other identities of the foreign investors.
Practical implications –This studymay help policy makers in the UAE to improve the implementation and
enforcement of existing regulations concerning corporate social responsibility (CSR) and board independence.
It also highlights the need to look into the monitoring role of independent board members.
Originality/value – This is the first study to examine the role of board independence on the relationship
between foreign ownership and firm’s financial and social performance. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first paper that attempts to enrich the understanding of foreign ownership by classifying it into Arab
versus non-Arab.
Keywords Ownership, Board independence, Firm performance, Social performance, The UAE
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Foreign investment is one of the key engines to economic growth in any country.
Governments constantly endeavor to attract foreign investment in order to create new jobs,
develop economic infrastructure and attract new technologies and management styles. In
order to be able to do this, governments attempt to create a better business environment for
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tax reductions. Corporate governance mechanisms have important implications for firms’
financial policies and investor protection (Hussainey and Aljifri (2012).
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) was the third largest destination to attract foreign investments
in West Asia between 2003 and 2008. The UAE is a pioneer in construction growth and
business opportunities. It is ranked first in terms of construction profitability and among the
fastest growing countries around the globe (Langdon, 2008; 2012). With the high foreign
investment inflow into the UAE, foreign ownership has become an integral part in the
ownership structure of companies.
However, this growth has come in the face of several challenges. For example, a net
withdrawal of foreign investment of AED 11.5bnwas recorded in 2008. This negative outflow
of foreign investment from the UAE’s markets raises many questions of investors’ protection
and the role of corporate governance in the UAE. This study examines whether return or firm
performance influences foreign investors to sell their shares and the role of independence
boards in protecting foreign investors.
In 2009, the Emirates securities market decreased dramatically with a 70%decline in the
Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX), and a 43.2% decline in the Dubai Financial Market
(DFM). Stock market performance has an influence on the performance of firms and the
type of ownership plays a major role in firms’ financial (Liu et al., 2012) and social
performance (e.g Khan et al., 2013; McGuinness et al., 2017; Oh et al., 2011). Jensen and
Meckling (1976) were by far the first to highlight the distribution of share ownership
between owners and how this allocation can affect both the firm’s financial and social
performance.
Since then, ownership structure has been considered theoretically and empirically as a
significant explanatory mechanism that could influence firm’s financial and social
performance. In general, it is believed that foreign investors have better capability to
manage firms, usually through use of advanced technology, experience in business and
innovative ideas to turn companies around (Huang and Shiu, 2009). Moreover, foreign
investors may be more inclined to pay attention to social issues because of their familiarity
with these issues, higher sensitivity to such matters and therefore, greater emphasis on
corporate social responsibility (CSR) in their home countries. This is more so because of the
emerging role of CSR engagement as an important signaling mechanism that may reduce
uncertainty and information asymmetry in the securities market.
Additionally, foreign investors may be forced to be far-sighted rather than myopic,
because they may find it difficult to dispose their holdings without significantly affecting
stock price. Foreign investors, therefore, are a priori more likely to advocate firms’
engagement in CSR as theymay perceive CSR activities asmeans of facilitating firm survival
in the long run.
However, results regarding the relationship between foreign ownership and firms’
financial and social performance effort are rather mixed (Sanchez-Ballesta and Garcia-Meca,
2007). For instance, a host of prior studies report a positive association between foreign
investment and firms’ financial and social performance (e.g Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Khan
et al., 2013; McGuinness et al., 2017; Oh et al., 2011; Sukumara, 2017). On the other hand, some
document no relationship at all (e.g Azlan and Devi., 2008; Cahyani and Suryaningsih, 2016;
Roshima et al., 2009). The reason for this inconsistency could be the fact that the extant
literature considers foreign investors to be a homogeneous group, representing similar
features and traits. However, we postulate that the heterogeneity in attitude and behavior of
the investors themselves can differentially influence firm strategies. This is something that
has not been explored in prior studies.
Therefore, and to bridge the gap in the prior literature, we classify foreign ownership into




We expect differences in the impact of these two groups on firm behavior and performance
for two reasons.
First, Arab foreign investors share a common culture, religion and language with
companies in the UAE and in addition, their countries are mostly classified as developing
countries. Chahine and Tohme (2009) argue that non-Arab foreign shareholders in the Arab
countries outperform their domestic counterparts in term of experience, credibility and
monitoring capabilities.
Second, as argued earlier, foreign investors have better capabilities to run companies
(Huang and Shiu, 2009). Strong foreign investors who have such capabilities are known to
come from developed countries with experience in certain business background and dealing
with financial and social issues. However, the situation is rather different with the rapid
growth of developing economies and the large investments by investors now pouring in from
these countries. While these investors may have the financial resources to invest, they lack
the innovation of developed-economies’ investors. Therefore, it is not a priori clear whether
the argument above still holds. For instance, few studies find a negative influence of foreign
ownership on firm performance (Phung and Le, 2013).
We then go on to examine the role of independent board members in influencing the
relationship between foreign ownership in general and these two types of foreign ownership
and firm financial and social performance. Board independence is considered a crucial
corporate governance mechanism in disciplining the management and protecting the
interests of minority shareholders. Muniandy and Hillier (2015) argue that board
independence is crucial for attracting foreign investment. Moreover, a review of the
literature indicates that board independence enhances a firm’s financial (Conyon and Peck,
1998;Weisbach, 1988; Brown and Caylor, 2009) and social performance (e.g Badrul and Nava,
2015; Jo and Harjoto, 2012; Post et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2013).
Even though financial and social issues are one of the most urgent issues attracting the
attention of practitioners and academic researchers worldwide, few studies have focused
attention on the determinants of firms’ financial and social performance, particularly the
impact of differential foreign ownership. We believe this to be a significant contribution of
this paper particularly as social performance becomes an important determinant for
improving the corporate image and attracting customers
Research on the role of foreign ownership in the UAE is scarce although there is a
dramatic increase in foreign ownership in the UAE. Additionally, financial scandals and
high-profile environmental disasters have heightened the scrutiny over firms’ financial and
social performance on a global scale. Finally, Shahzad and Jamal (2008) point out that
traditional societies in developing nations are not conducive for the adoption of western-
styled rational corporate governance models. Many companies in Gulf countries including
the UAE have implemented CSR, corporate governance guidelines and codes that mirror
those adopted by firms in western countries, where the stakeholder awareness of company
accountability is high. Given that capital markets in developing economies are still maturing
and their institutional, social, legal and regulatory frameworks differ from those of developed
nations, it is worthwhile studying the impact of foreign ownership and board independence
on the UAE firms’ financial and social performance.
This article makes three major contributions. First, the role of foreign ownership has
been widely studied in governance and the finance literature. However, little focus has
been laid on the identity of these foreign investors. Most prior studies treat foreign
investors as one, homogenous category with the same characteristics and nuances. To
the best of our knowledge, this research is the first to use a detailed dataset to
investigate foreign ownership identities in the UAE. The study highlights the critical
influence of two different foreign investor identities on firm financial and social






results also extend our knowledge as to why the identity of foreign investors differs in
influencing performance.
Second, this article integrates board independence with the relationship between foreign
investors and firm financial and social performance. The empirical approach we take
expands our understanding as to how board independence impacts different types of foreign
investors influence on firm performance. At a policy level, the study could help improve the
implementation and enforcement of existing regulations concerning CSR and board
independence.
Third, most evidence till date, on the relationship between foreign ownership and firm
performance is for developed economies. However, there is still a need to investigate the
relationship in the context of the UAE, whose financial landscape and attractiveness as an
investment destination make it rather unique.
2. An overview of the UAE
The UAE, established in 1971, is a country in the Middle East, made up of seven emirates—
Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain, Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah. It is an
open economywith a federal government system. AbuDhabi andDubai are the key drivers of
the UAE’s economy as they hold around 85% of the UAE’s GDP. About 68% of the UAE’s
population is located in both these emirates (C.I.A, 2009).
The UAE has two main stock markets: ADX and DFM. The stock market regulator for
both these markets is the Securities and Commodities Authority (SCA). The SCA was
established in 2000 under law No.4 of the year 2000. The SCA administers and links the ADX
and DFM and is responsible for enforcing the corporate governance code and other
regulations by the listed firms in both markets.
The SCA provides daily reports of the performance and trading activities of both markets
and companies. It issues a daily index of the ESM (also called the SCA index) which is
officially the index of both markets. It also provides live market watch screens in different
cities around the country. There is an annual report and several brochures issued by the SCA
which contain the activities and other data of companies of both markets which is a rich
source of information.
The ADX, established on November 12th, 2000, is the main stock market in the UAE. It is
financially independent, has legal, autonomous status and an independent management,
which enable it to discharge its responsibilities in a fair manner. The ADX has several main
objectives. It aims to achieve sustainable growth of the national economy by providing
opportunities to the public for savings and investments. In addition, it also seeks to establish
principles for ensuring investor protection.
The ADX exercises strict control over securities’ transactions and promotes investor
education. It attempts to regulate and maintain reasonable levels of supply and demand
through the regulation of transactions. It also focuses on maintaining price stability and
liquidity of securities listed on the market. The DFM is the second stock market in the UAE
which was launched by Resolution No.14 of the year 2000. The DFM provides good
environment for trading stocks of public companies or any bonds issued by the local and the
federal government and other institutions. It also trades foreign or local units of investment
funds or any other financial instruments. According to the UNCTAD, the UAE was the third
largest attraction for foreign direct investments inWest Asia between 2003 and 2008. A total
of 150 corporations of the Fortune 500 companies are represented in Dubai, including the top
ten. In addition, the UAE has 23 free zones which attract several multinational and foreign
firms from all over the world. Jabal Ali is one of the free zones and is considered as one of the
largest zones in the world, hosting around 5,000 companies from over 100 countries globally
(CRA, 2007). Dubai is considered the third re-exporter center after Hong Kong and Singapore




TheUAEhas also top-rated institutions, both regionally and globally. The largest sovereign
wealth fund in the world is in the UAE. The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA), for
example, holds an approximate wealth of US$ 750 to 900bn (Abdelal, 2009). The Dubai
International Financial Center (DIFC) is a financial hub for theMiddle Eastern region. It aims to
provide a total view of international standards regarding business rules and regulations that
meet the local environment in creating sustainable economic development in the region. The
Hawkama Institute for Corporate Governance (HICG) is also a unique institution in the region
which was created in 2005. It was established to assist the UAE and businesses in the region to
adopt and implement corporate governance frameworks of a high quality.
To build trust and gain investors’ confidence, the government of the UAE promoted
reliable legislation, including corporate governance regulations. Therefore, the SCA
introduced its first version of the corporate governance code in 2007. The final version of
the code was passed in 2009, making it applicable to all listed firms on the ADX and the DFM,
starting April, 2010.
The corporate governance code is mainly based on the international governance
standards. The Code consists of 16 main articles that incorporate all the aspects of corporate
governance in a firm. The third article sets the method for the appointment of the board of
directors, with emphasis on board independence. Criteria for “independence” are also
described in the same article.
The third article stipulates that at least one-third of the board members shall be
independent. It defines an “independent director” as one who is not, nor her/his spouse, nor
his/her other first-degree relative, a member of the management of the firm during the last
two years of the appointment or has any financial deals with the firm, the sister firm, parent
firm or any related firm during the last two years if the total amount of the transactions is 5
million AED or more than 5% of the paid up capital of the firm.
The corporate governance code is expected to increase investor confidence and protect
their interests. However, the Arab investment infrastructure in general, despite its recent
growth, remains less developed than its western counterparts. Arab countries continue to
have weak regulatory frameworks and markets for corporate control. In the presence of poor
external governance mechanisms such as these, internal corporate governance assumes a
more important role in addressing agency problems. In terms of ownership, Arab firms
typically demonstrate concentration of ownership with strong family and political influence
(Chahine and Tohme, 2009). Therefore, one expects governance mechanisms such as board
independence to be more effective in addressing agency problems than traditional
mechanisms such as board size or number of board meetings. Independence can be
indicative of the exercise of power and the extent of managerial domination of Arab investors
who usually act as board members (Chahine and Tohme, 2009)
3. Literature review and hypothesis development
3.1 Foreign ownership and firm financial performance
The prior literature suggests that foreign firms investing abroad have superior utilizable
capabilities compared to their domestic peers (Buckley and Casson, 1976, 2003; Dunning,
1988; Porter, 2011). Agency Theory attempts to explain the relationship between different
types of ownership concentration with firm performance, including the role of foreign
concentrated ownership (Chhibber and Majumdar, 1999). Agency Theory argues that the
existence of foreign ownership in a firm is associatedwith better firm performance (Haat et al.,
2008). Hingorani, Lehn, and Makhija (1997) conclude that foreign ownership reduces agency
problems by better aligning the interests of shareholders and management.
It is assumed that the increase in foreign ownership in a firm, irrespective of industry-type,






experience of foreign firms vis-a-vis their domestic counterparts (Caves, 2007). Some of the
earlier studies observe such direct effects of foreign ownership with particular reference to
OECD countries (Dunning and Pearce, 1977; Forsyth and Docherty, 1972; Globerman, 1979).
Recent empirical studies demonstrate that the relationship between foreign ownership
and firm performance is rather unclear, or mixed. It is argued that foreign involvement in the
ownership of a firm might have different effects on firm performance. Several studies have
investigated the association between foreign ownership and firm performance around the
world and at different periods of time (Akimova and Schw€odiauer, 2004; Arouri et al., 2014;
Aydin et al., 2007; Douma et al., 2006; Goethals and Ooghe, 1997; Gunduz and Tatoglu, 2003;
Isik et al., 2004; Khawar, 2003; Yudaeva et al., 2003; Zheka, 2005).
Arouri et al. (2014) examine the relationship between foreign ownership and firm
performance for banks in the Gulf region. They find that the involvement of foreign investors
in the ownership structure of a firm improves its performance. Aydin et al. (2007) compare the
performance of firms owned by foreign investors with those owned by local shareholders, for
all listed firms on the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) for the years 2003 and 2004. They find
that firms with foreign ownership perform better than those with no foreign involvement.
Yudaeva et al. (2003) compare the productivity of domestic Russian firms to those with
foreign ownership. Results indicate that firms with foreign involvement are more productive
than the domestic Russian firms. They attribute the results to better management and access
to superior technology for foreign-owned firms.
Many other studies have documented the positive relationship between foreign ownership
and firm performance. Among others, Goethals and Ooghe (1997) compare the performance
of Belgian domestic and foreign-owned companies. Gunduz and Tatoglu (2003) examine non-
financial firms listed on ISE. Isik et al. (2004) study Turkish banks during the period between
1981 and 1990. Other studies document similar positive results (Boubakri et al., 2005;
Khawar, 2003).
Some other studies in this area of research have investigated unique characteristics of
firms with foreign ownership which can influence the relationship between foreign
ownership and firm performance. For example, Douma et al. (2006) adopt a multi-theoretic
approach to examine the influence of different types of foreign corporate shareholders and
foreign institutions on firm performance of promising markets. They find that the positive
relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance is driven by foreign firms that
have higher commitment, larger ownership and longer involvement. They also document a
positive impact of foreign ownership on the performance of financial institutions which
differs based on the business group affiliation of firms.
Chhibber and Majumdar (1999) examine the impact of foreign involvement on the
performance of firms listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange. They classify foreign ownership
according to different levels of the firms’ ownership control. These categories are defined
based on the Indian institutional environment that helps define property rights accruing at
different levels of ownership. Return on sales (ROS) and ROA are used to measure firm
performance. Results indicate that foreign ownership has a significantly positive influence on
various dimensions of firm performance. The UAE is one of the most attractive countries for
foreign investment in the Middle East. However, there is a withdrawal of foreign investors
from the market after the financial crisis, which makes it a worthwhile for this study to
investigate the performance of foreign investors in the UAE in the period of the study.
Therefore, and building on the literature outlined so far, we develop the following hypothesis:
H1a. Foreign ownership is positively associated with firm financial performance.
On the contrary, some other studies document that the positive influence of foreign
ownership on firm performance may not always hold or may vary by ownership levels.




governance and performance of 202 large and medium Ukrainian firms for the period 1998–
2000. They find that of all types of ownership, firm performance is most strongly associated
with foreign ownership. They also find that the influence of foreign ownership on
performance is positive only up to the point where ownership falls short of majority holding.
Of the crisis-hit economies, Choi and Hasan (2005) study Korean commercial banks from
1998–2002 and find a significantly positive relationship between foreign involvement and
bank performance measured using different indicators. While they find no statistically
significant relationship at low levels of foreign ownership, bank risk and returns are
significantly and positively associated with high levels of foreign ownership.
On the other hand, Phung and Le (2013) examine the relationship for listed firms on
Vietnam’s Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange during the period 2008–2011. They find that foreign
ownership has a negative impact on firm performance for firms in Vietnam. They also
conclude that the monitoring role of foreign ownership in emerging economies is weaker,
owing to weak corporate governance and information asymmetry in these economies.
Phung and Mishra (2016) find that foreign ownership positively influences firm
performance only up to a certain level, beyond which the relationship turns negative.
Praptiningsih (2009) investigate firms in Asian emerging markets and conclude that foreign
ownership has a significantly negative influence on firm performance. Zheka (2005) also
examines the influence of different ownership types on the efficiency and quality of corporate
governance. Using a sample of Ukrainian firms for the period 2000–2001, he finds that foreign
affiliation in firms does not enhance performance.
Based on the literature examined so far, foreign investors have better technological and
financial resources and the experience to manage investments. This in turn enhances firm
efficiency and performance. However, different studies have documented largely, a negative
or non-linear relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance.
We argue that “effective” foreign investors who possess superior capability and
management skills come from developed countries. The current foreign investment situation
is different, with the rise of developing economies and the large investmentsmade bywealthy
investors from these countries. These investorsmight have the financial resources but hardly
have the innovation that investors of developed economies possess.
To empirically investigate this hypothesis, we classify foreign ownership in the UAE into
two categories—foreign Arab investors and foreign non-Arab investors. Arab countries are
commonly believed to be less developed than non-Arab ones.
Foreign investors are more likely to encourage a participative management style whereas
Arab investors tend to favor an authoritative management style with strong influence from
family, political and tribal ties (Chahine and Tohme, 2009). Also, Ali (1995) argues that Arab
management style suffers from fragmented culture and past history that is not supportive for
enhancing today’s management practice. We therefore, hypothesize the following:
H1b. Non-Arab foreign investors outperform Arab foreign investors in influencing firm
financial performance.
3.2 Foreign ownership, board independence and firm financial performance
Muniandy and Hillier (2015) find that board independence has a positive, synergistic effect in
congruence with other variables in influencing firm performance. They argue that
independence of the board is important for growth in the firm’s financial performance. P.
Brown et al. (2011) assert that the independence of the board has a crucial role to play in the
monitoring effectiveness of the board. And since large shareholders may have more power
than minority shareholders, strong monitoring is needed to align the interests of the minority






Several studies have documented the positive role of board independence in protecting
shareholders’ interest (Conyon and Peck, 1998; Weisbach, 1988). Black et al. (2006) and L.
Brown and Caylor (2009) report an influence of the proportion of independent directors on the
board on firm performance. However, other studies find no significant role of independent
board in influencing firm performance (Goh et al., 2014; R. Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; van
Essen et al., 2012)
To date, results on the association between board independence and firm performance
remain mixed at best. Adams et al. (2010) and Goh et al. (2014) argue that the role of board
independence can be better understood as a moderating mechanism.
Governance mechanisms such as board independence are expected to be more effective in
addressing agency problems and monitoring than any typical governance mechanisms.
Independence can be indicative of the exercise of power and the extent of managerial
domination of Arab investors who usually act as boardmembers (Chahine andTohme, 2009).
Independent boards in the environment of the UAE are crucial particularly among firms with
foreign investors. Ali (1995) argues that the political and economic crises in the region show
how the Arab states are cautious of foreign influence which motivates investigating board
independent in firms with foreign investors.
The role of independent boards might be more pronounced when studied with foreign
investment holding. Therefore, we conjecture the following hypotheses:
H2a. The relationship between foreign investor holding and financial performance of the
firm is influenced by a higher proportion of independent directors on the board.
H2b. The relationship between non-Arab foreign investor holding and financial
performance of the firm is influenced by a higher proportion of independent
directors on the board.
H2c. The relationship between Arab foreign investor holding and financial performance
of the firm is influenced by a higher proportion of independent directors on
the board.
3.3 Foreign ownership and firm social performance
A review of literature indicates that key shareholders exert direct influence on organizational
decision-making, motivation and power (Finkelstein, 1992). For example, the key
shareholders can affect a company’s decision to invest, by proposing and voting on the
company’s strategic decisions through different conduits (Oh et al., 2011). One area the key
shareholders may involve themselves in the company’s strategic decision-making is in the
area of CSR investment.
In recent times, CSR has received a significant amount of attention from both business
practitioners and academic researchers (Oh et al., 2011; Panicker, 2017). Several determinants
of CSR spending have been investigated in prior research. Even when investment in CSR is
influenced by the choices, motives and values of those who are involved in formulating and
taking decisions in the company, ownership structure continues to be an important
determinant (Khan et al., 2013). In the case of UAE, one of the key shareholders is foreign
investors. This is because foreigners may hold a substantial number of shares in UAE
corporations.
Foreign investors differ from their domestic counterparts with regard to preferences,
familiarity, time horizons and the extent of information asymmetry (Panicker, 2017; Oh et al.,
2011). For example, foreign investors with a long-term investment horizon are more likely to
consider a company’s social behavior as a material investment decision that can increase the
likelihood of long-term survival of the company. Moreover, foreign investors are expected to




exposure (Khan et al., 2013). Finally, foreign investors are subject to greater information
asymmetry stemming from separation of ownership between managers and shareholders
geographically and are at a greater risk resulting from investing in a foreign country
(Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Gehrig, 1993).
Therefore, these investors would most likely prefer to invest in socially responsible
firms, since increased CSR engagement is viewed as tool to reduce information asymmetry
and risk (Oh et al., 2011). A growing body of the literature has explored the association
between foreign ownership and CSR practices in both developed and developing countries.
None of the studies, however, investigate the impact of foreign ownership on CSR activities
in the UAE.
In the Asian context, Haniffah and Cooke (2005), Khan et al. (2013) and Panicker (2017)
provide empirical evidence that foreign ownership is positively associated with CSR
performance. By examining the determinants of CSR disclosure quality in both voluntary and
mandatory CSR reporting regimes, the findings of Zainal (2017) indicate that the quality of
CSR reporting increases with a higher proportion of foreign ownership in the firm. Using
Korean and Chinese firm data, Oh et al. (2011) and McGuninness et al. (2017), respectively
document higher CSR rating in firmswith greater institutional and foreign ownership. Suzuki
and Tanimoto (2005) find that the presence of high foreign ownership in Japanese public
companies leads the companies to seriously embark on CSR and display greater CSR
performance.
Using Egyptian data for the period 2007–2009, Soliman et al. (2012) document a positive
relationship between foreign ownership and social performance. Muttakin and Subramaniam
(2015) document a similar positive association. They also find that community,
environmental, employed/human resources and product and services information
increases with foreign ownership.
In the light of the institutional theory, involving oneself in CSR practices is seen as a
proactive, legitimate strategy to gain continued inflow of capital and please ethical investors
(Muttakin and Subramaniam, 2015). Companies usually communicate their concern about
social and environmental issues in order to legitimize their existence in the eyes of investors
(Amran and Devi, 2008). Given the fact that substantial funds in the UAE’s capital market
come from foreign investors, UAE companies are expected to engage more in CSR activities
to satisfy these foreign investors.
Moreover, foreign investors, such as those from developed countries, possess long
standing and more ingrained attitudes toward CSR (McGuinness et al., 2017). As argued
earlier, companies may invest in CSR as a way to signal their trustworthiness and, therefore,
foreign investors may prefer to invest in companies with high CSR rating to minimize risk
and uncertainty (Oh et al., 2011). Having made their investment based on CSR rating, foreign
shareholders are more likely to create coercive pressure for local firms to seriously embrace
CSR to avoid loss of investment due to regulatory sanctions or bankruptcy. Thus, we
conjecture that foreign investors would demand UAE companies to display greater CSR
performance and by doing so, companies will continue to attract more investments as well as
keep the current ones. Based on the institutional theory, we formulate the following
hypothesis:
H3a. Foreign ownership is positively associated with firm social performance.
It has been argued that not all foreign investors are always supportive of social investments
(Oh et al., 2011). Anecdotally, some corporations with foreign investors have been involved in
anti-social behavior (Davis and Kim, 2007; Yoshikawa et al., 2010). Thus, it becomes
necessary to identify the identity of foreign investors that could help identify their
investments orientation and preferences. This, we believe, can help to better affirm the






and social performance. Moreover, how the identity of foreign investors impacts social
performance has yet to be explored.
Wasowska (2013) postulates that ownership characteristics determine the different goals,
mode of operations and preferred use of resources available to a company. Additionally,
Haniffa and Cooke (2005) suggest considering the values, motives and choices of those
involved in CSR-related decisions within the company. Extant literature also supports this
line of argument (Amran and Devi, 2008, Said et al., 2009, Meutia et al., 2017, Swandari and
Sadikin, 2016, and Cahyani and Suryaningsih, 2016) who found foreign ownership has no
significant influence on CSR.
In the UAE, non-Arab investors come usually from developed countries where CSR is seen
as both necessary and desirable. Therefore, compared to Arab investors, non-Arab foreign
investors are expected to be more familiar with social and environmental issues and have
greater emphasis on CSR in their home countries. The lack of understanding of the
importance of CSR activities and the potential benefits of engaging in them are obstacles that
have left developing countries lagging behind, in terms of CSR (Meutia et al., 2017).
Since non-Arab foreign investors from developed countries are in favor of active CSR
engagement, the investors might perceive social investments as means that lead to increased
chances of long-term survival of a corporation and not as a way of squandering the
company’s resources for charity and other non-business-related expenditures. Furthermore,
the weaker political ties non-Arab foreign investors have with local government may incline
them to promote CSR practices much more strongly in a hope to expand their network in the
UAE firms they invest in as well as for the firms to have easy access to bank funding and to
obtain government subsidies.
It has been believed that CSR in developing countries is still rooted in amore philanthropic
culture where there is still emphasis on formal accountability processes (Jamali and
Mirshak, 2007).
Moreover, Dyck et al. (2017) argue that foreign investors play an active role in driving the
social performance of a company only if they are from countries with a strong CSR culture.
Since investors from developed countries prefer active CSR engagement, they are likely to
exert their power on local firms. In the light of underlying differences in socio-cultural factors
between Arab and non-Arab foreign investors discussed above, we conjecture that non-Arab
foreign investors with significant shareholding can exert pressure on UAE companies to
actively engage in CSR activities. This assumption is formulated in the following hypothesis:
H3b. Firms with higher levels of non-Arab foreign ownership are more likely to exhibit
greater social performance, compared to their counterparts.
3.4 Foreign ownership, board independence and firm social performance
A company’s board of directors is the main body responsible for designing, implementing
and improving the firm’s contribution to sustainable development andwell-being (Ortas et al.,
2017). The board is also responsible for defining the company’s objectives and the strategies
to attain them (Jo and Harjoto, 2012; Zahm, 1989). It is in the best interest of companies
therefore, to have effective boards whose members take into account the wider interest of all
stakeholders and be champions for good CSR practices (Welford, 2007).
The best way to ensure effective boards that act in tandem with good CSR practices is to
make sure that they have a good number of independent members. Evan and Freeman (1988)
argue that owing to the experience and expertise that independent directors bring on board,
their induction allows firms to develop strategic policies that address a wider range of key
stakeholder needs and claims. Moreover, instrumental stakeholder theory alleges that
independent board members are more likely to be committed to CSR and also satisfy the




A review of the literature indicates that outside directors have different time horizons,
values and attitudes toward CSR activities compared to their insider counterparts. Outside
directors are less attentive than insiders to investors’wealthmaximization goal and appear to
be more concerned with CSR (Ibrahim and Angelidis, 1995; Ibrahim et al., 2003). Unlike the
remuneration of topmanagers, independent directors’ remuneration is not linked to the firm’s
financial performance. Therefore, independent directors are less likely to prioritize short-term
financial performance targets and more likely to place greater value on the firm’s long-term
sustainability (Ibrahim et al., 2003; Jizi et al., 2014).
Johnson and Greening (1999) assert that outside directors display more interest in
complying with environmental standards than insiders (Johnson and Greening, 1999).
Moreover, relative to insiders, outside directors are found to pay more attention to
philanthropic activities (Ibrahim et al., 2003). This is because outside directors may feel that
advocating investments in environmental and philanthropic areas is the best way to
increase the long-term sustainability of a firm (Post et al., 2011). Given these differences
between insiders and outsiders with respect to CSR behavior, one can expect that firmswith
a higher proportion of independent directors on board display greater concern for CSR
performance.
A vast body of research suggests that independent boards can play an effective role in
improving CSR performance. For example, using a sample of 2,039 US firms, Jo and Harjoto
(2012) document a positive impact of board independence on CSR performance. Similarly,
Zhang et al. (2013) focus on the 500 largest companies listed on the US stock exchanges and
document that a larger presence of independent directors on the board allows firms to obtain
better levels of CSR spending. In the same vein, Zahm (1989) concludes that firms with more
independent boards generally experience higher levels of CSR performance.
Jizi et al. (2014) examine a sample of large US commercial banks and report a positive
relationship between board independence and CSR performance. Similarly, Post et al. (2011)
analyze 78 Fortune 1,000 firms and provide empirical evidence of a positive impact of the
independence of board on CSR performance. Khan (2010) examines a sample of Bangladesh
banks and concludes that an increased board representation of independent directors results
in higher CSR performance for the banks.
In a related vein, Lone et al. (2016) analyze a sample of 50 firms in Pakistan and document a
positive relationship between the independence of boards and CSR performance. Huang
(2015) uses a sample of 297 electronic firms operating inTaiwan and finds that the presence of
independent members on firms’ boards has a positive impact on social performance.
Using a sample of 300 large Australian firms, Galbreath (2017) finds that a higher
proportion of inside directors on a company’s board decreases CSR performance. Ortas et al.
(2017), using ameta-analysis approach, document that firmswithmore independent directors
exhibit greater CSR performance. Other studies that document a similar positive board
independence- CSR performance relationship are Dunn and Sainty (2009), Sahin et al. (2011).
Khan et al. (2013), Nitm and Soobaroyen (2013), and Muttakin and Subramaniam (2015).
Consistent with the overinvestment hypothesis, however, managers are more inclined to
overinvest in CSR to increase their private benefits of reputation-building as good social
citizens, probably at the expense of shareholders (Barnea and Rubin, 2010). Overconfident
managers who are not closely monitored may squander corporate resources in value-
destroying investments (Goel and Takor, 2008) as thosemanagers may prefer to enjoy a quiet
life rather than active empire building (Bertrand and Mullainanthan, 2003). Since well-
designed corporate governance systems prevent overinvestment, one can expect a negative
relation between board independence and CSR performance.
Extant empirical research also suggests that board independence can inversely impact
CSR performance (e.g. Hanniffa and Cook, 2005; Orti z-de-Mandojana, 2016). Moreover, most






also run the firms (Welford, 2007). Usually, the priority of these family members is to increase
their own wealth and retain control on firms in their ownership (Welford, 2007). Therefore,
they may see little need for investment in CSR activities and increasing transparency.
As family members are in a position to choose and elect board members, one can realize
that independent directors in such cases would be much less likely to exercise their power to
ensure managerial compliance with social expectations of the firm. Welford (2007) argues
that independent directors in Asian countries sometimes act deferentially to management in
the hope ofmaintaining their remunerated positions. Furthermore, Sobhan andWemer (2003)
conclude that due to family dominance, the presence of independent directors on boards of
companies in developing countries tends to be largely ceremonial. Keeping in line with the
discussion above, the following hypotheses are formulated:
H4a. The relationship between foreign investors’ holding and the firm’s social
performance is influenced by a higher proportion of independent directors.
H4b. The relationship between non-Arab foreign investors’ holding and the firm’s social
performance is influenced by a higher proportion of independent directors.
H4c. The relationship between Arab foreign investors’ holding and the firm’s social
performance is influenced by a higher proportion of independent directors.
4. Research methodology
4.1 Data collection
We employ a firm-level panel dataset over the period 2008–2012 of all listed firms on ADX
and DFM. Both markets have an average of 128 listed firms per year as shown in Table 1.
For the purpose of this paper, we collected the board independence and social performance
data manually from the annual reports, corporate governance reports and other stock
market reports. Data on foreign and institutional ownership were collected from the
websites of the respective stock markets as well as from the guides of listed companies and
annual bulletins which are available on the websites of the stock markets and the SCA.
Finally, financial data were collected from the Thomson Financial DataStream database.
Consistent with the literature, we exclude foreign firms and firms with missing data on
required variables (192 firm-year observations in five years). Our final dataset is an
unbalanced panel of 451 firm-year observations for the years 2008–2012. The distribution of
the sample can be seen in Table 1.
We targeted the period from 2008 to 2012 for several reasons. First, this period is
following the first introduction of the corporate governance code in the UAE in April 2007
and during the implementation. Second, it was a period of economic downturn of what




Years ADX DFM ADX DFM ADX DFM Total
2008 65 65 12 30 53 35 88
2009 67 66 11 31 56 35 91
2010 64 65 8 30 56 35 91
2011 67 61 12 26 55 35 90
2012 66 57 10 22 56 35 91








Recession. Different studies recommended studying corporate governance during
economic turbulence (Al-Gamrh et al., 2018; Hassan and Halbouni, 2013). Finally, the
SCA reported a negative net foreign investment in the Emirati markets in 2008 which
sporadically occurred after crisis.
4.2 Variable measurement and model specification
4.2.1 Dependent variables. Firm financial performance is measured using two proxies. ROA is
calculated as net income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets and ROI as defined
by Worldscope. On the other hand, firm social performance is measured based on the index
developed by Al-Gamrh et al. (2018) that examines UAE firms along their social dimension.
The index comprises four questions–whether the firmuses environment-friendlymaterials or
hasmade any positive contribution to protect the environment; whether the company has any
human or social development programs; whether the company is free of any penalties
resulting from violations of any governance or securities law; and whether the firm has an
internal audit system. The firm’s annual reports, CSR and corporate governance reports and
other market reports were screened to answer our four questions in the index. The answer to
each question is binary, equaling 1 if the company meets the criteria and 0 otherwise. After
reading the firm’s reports, for the first question, the firm scores 1 if it contributed in any way
to protect the environment. For example,
Our IT department donates old and outdated electronic equipment for recycling. This prevents the
leakage of harmful toxic materials into the environment. DSI’s active recycling methods have been
lauded and acknowledged by theEnvironservewhich lauded the company for recycling 104 pieces of
IT equipment weighing nearly 900 kilos. These ranged from computers, monitors, printers and
laptops (Drake and Scull, 2012 CG report, p. 34)
For the second question, it was scored 1 if the firm has any social development activities. For
example,
The company sponsored several community development activities such as Dubai women
marathon, world diving championship 2012, Dubai tennis championship . . . (Dubai refreshments CG
report 2012, p. 9)
For the third question, it was verified if the firm has an internal audit unit. For the last
question, the firm scored 1 if it did not pay any fines to the SCA during the year. The index is
the sum of the four questions and thus ranges from 0 to 4. A higher index value indicates
greater social performance.
4.2.2 Independent and control variables. Foreign ownership is measured by the percentage
of shares held by foreign investors to total shares issued by the firm. Arab and non-Arab
ownership are measured using the percentage of shares held by each investors’ identity
group. We used the stock markets’ classification of Arab and non-Arab investors. They
classify Arab investors as the investors whom nationality from any of the 22 Arab League
countries. Board independence is measured by a dummy variable that assumes a value of 1 if
at least one-third of the board comprises independent members.
In addition, we control for the size of the firm, leverage and institutional ownership. Firm
size is measured as the log of market capitalization, institutional ownership as the percentage
of shares held by national institutions and leverage as total debt scaled by total assets.
4.3 Regression models
To achieve the objectives of this study, we employed several different regression models.
First, we run a basic regression specification to test the influence of foreign ownership on firm






board independence and foreign ownership to identify the role of board independence in the
relationship. Finally, we segregate foreign ownership into Arab and non-Arab and regress
them as well as their interactions with board independence on firm financial and social
performance in model 3 and 4. The four regression models are outlined as follows:
Perfit ¼ β0 þ β1 INSOWNit þ β2 LVRGit þþβ3 SIZEit þ β4 INDPþ β5FOWNit
þ Year dummiesþ εit (1)
Perfit ¼ β0 þ β1 INSOWNit þ β2 LVRGit þþβ3 SIZEit þ β4 INDPþ β5 FOWNit
þ β6ðFOWN3INDPÞit þ Year dummiesþ εit (2)
Perfit ¼ β0 þ β1 INSOWNit þ β2 LVRGit þþβ3 SIZEit þ β4 INDPþ β5 ARABit
þ β6 NONARBit þ Year dummiesþ εit (3)
Perfit ¼ β0 þ β1 INSOWNit þ β2 LVRGit þþβ3 SIZEit þ β4 INDPþ β5 ARABit
þ β6 NONARBit þ β7ðARAB3 INDPÞit þ β8ðNONARB3 INDPÞit
þ Yeardummies þ εit (4)
Where,
For each firm (i) and each year (t)
Perf 5 Denotes ROA/ROI/Social performance index
LVRG 5 Total debt/total assets
FOWN 5 Percentage of foreign ownership
ARAB 5 Percentage of shares held by Arab investors
NONARB 5 Percentage of shares held by non-Arab investors
INSOWN 5 Percentage of institutional ownership
SIZE 5 The natural logarithm of market capitalization
Years 5 Dummy variables for years (year fixed-effects)
ε 5 Error term
We started with the application of the Hausman test to our models, only to find that the fixed-
effects specification is most appropriate for our dataset. However, diagnostic tests confirmed
the presence of heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and cross-sectional dependence in our
data. To correct for that, this study uses Driscoll and Kraay’s standard errors based on
(Hoechle, 2007)), which are robust to all the three–heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and
cross-sectional dependence. The adjusted Driscoll and Kraay’s standard errors represent a







Descriptive statistics of the variables are reported in Table 2. As mentioned earlier, our
dataset represents an unbalanced panel comprising 451 firm-year observations for the period
2008–2012. From Table 2, we can see that for our measures of firm financial performance,
mean ROA is 2.24% and mean ROI, 5.38%. Social performance index has a mean of 1.02,
indicating that there only about 25.5% of firms met all the four conditions of our index.
The percentage of foreign ownership (FOWN) ranges between 0 and 66.9%with amean of
9.3%. Foreign ownership consists of Arab investors with amaximum of 66.9%and non-Arab
investors with amaximumof 32%. Themean ofArab and non-Arab investors’ holding is 11.4
and 5.9% respectively.
We also see that in general, the UAE firms in our sample have a high degree of
institutional ownership. The percentage of institutional ownership (INSOWN) varies from
0 to 99.96%, with a mean value of 41.3%. Table 3 presents detailed statistics relating to the
construction of the social index (Al-Gamrh et al., 2018). It also highlights the distribution of
sample firms across the four criteria laid down by the index.
5.2 Correlation analysis
Table 4 presents the correlation matrix for our key variables and offers some rich insights.
We can see the high correlation coefficient between ROA and ROI (0.907). This is to be
expected since they capture the same phenomenon – the financial performance of the firm.
We also note a negative and significant relationship between foreign ownership in the firm
and both ROA and ROI. Similarly, leverage is related negatively to both metrics of financial
performance, ROA and ROI. It is not surprising to find a strong, positive correlation between
board independence and our social index. This is consistent with our hypothesis about board
independence and CSR effort.
We also find a significant and negative relationship between foreign and institutional
ownership. This is not surprising, since both may be substituting each other as mechanisms
of corporate governance. We similarly observe a negative (and significant) correlation
between board independence and institutional holdings in the firm. We attribute this too, to
the substitutive nature of both mechanisms of alternate corporate governance.
N Mean SD Min Max
Independence 451 0.572 0.495 0 1
Non-Arab 451 0.0295 0.0594 0 0.320
Arab 451 0.0637 0.114 0 0.669
ROA 451 2.243 7.096 37.59 29.18
Firm size 451 6.080 0.664 4.350 7.929
Leverage 451 15.31 17.45 0 78.64
Foreign 451 0.0927 0.139 0 0.669
Institutional 451 0.413 0.258 0 0.99
ROI 451 5.381 10.71 68.45 45.10
Social 450 1.020 1.357 0 4
Note(s): The sample for this regression comprises 451 firm-year observations, representing listed firms on the
ADXandDFMover the period 2008–2012, for which data are available. Independence is a dummy that equals 1
if at least one-third of the board of directors are independent members. Non-Arab and Arab are the percentage
of shares owned by non-Arab and Arab investors, respectively. Foreign is the percentage of shares held by all
foreign investors collectively. Firm size is the natural log of market capitalization of the firm; Leverage is total
debt scaled by total assets; Institutional is the percentage of shares held by local institutional investors; ROA









6. Results and discussions
Firms with high foreign ownership are believed to have better opportunities since they have
superior utilizable capabilities compared to domestic firms and therefore, their involvement
in ownership is expected to boost firm performance. We, however, fail to find support for our
hypothesis, as can be seen in Table 5 and Table 6. Thus, H1a is not supported using both
regression specifications. Using two metrics of financial performance—ROA and ROI, we
find no statistical significance on the relationship between foreign ownership and firm
financial performance.
The argument we start with in the paper is that foreign ownership enhances firm
performance by bringing in more production techniques and sophisticated management
(Buckley and Casson, 1976, 2003; Dunning, 1988; Porter, 2011). However, one could say that
foreign ownership in the UAE is not concentrated enough to make a change that can
potentially affect performance.
In this regard, Choi and Hasan (2005) indicate that it is not simply the presence of foreign
ownership that can significantly influence the performance of Korean firms, but rather a high
enough level of foreign ownership. Along the same line, Chhibber and Majumdar (1999) find
that onlywhen foreign investors are armedwith proper authority and hold at least 50%of the
firm’s ownership are able to influence firm performance positively.
Further, it is doubtful that foreign investors can have total economic freedom to run firms
in developing countries based on their agenda. Aslund and Boone (2002) and Shleifer and
Vishny (1997) argue that corruption and high bureaucracy in developing economies could
prevent foreign investors from influencing firms to their full potential. While domestic
investors could better protect their rights using local connections, several techniques can in
fact be used against the interest of foreign investors, such as losing voting records or
declaring their shares illegal (Zheka, 2005).
Model 2 of Tables 5 and 6 demonstrates the role of board independence in influencing the
impact of foreign ownership on firm performance. Results show that in the presence of a
highly independent board, foreign ownership negatively influences firm performance.
Previous studies have documented inconsistent results of the impact of board independence
on firm performance. R. Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) argue that independent boardmembers in
emerging markets are used to legitimize the activities of the business rather than monitoring
management activities. We explain our results from different perspectives.
On the one hand, this result could indicate potential conflicts of interest or differences in
opinion of independentmembers of the board and foreign investors. For instance, the primary
objective of foreign investors could be the generation of short-term gains, while independent
board members may care more about long-term sustainability and gains. In this way, the
monitoring decisions of independent boards might go against short-term gains, which could
potentially disturb profitability.
Social performance (total) 25.5 %
(1) Does the firm use environment-friendly materials or have any positive contributions to
save environment? (It was verified if the firm contributed in any ways to protect the
environment)
113 25.1%
(2) Does the firm have any human and social development programs? (It was verified if the
firm has any social development activities)
56 12.4%
(3) Is there an internal audit system taking place in the company? (It was verified if the firmhas
an internal audit unit)
175 38.9%
(4) Is the company free of any SCA penalties and/or fining for governance malpractices or
other securities law violations during the last year? (It was verified if the company did not pay










































































































































































































































































































































































































Another explanation is that independent board members could be pursuing political
objectives rather than the expected role of monitoring firm activities and generation of profit.
This is not surprising since the majority of the board of directors in the UAE must be UAE
nationals. In thismanner, the influence of foreign investors in terms of their ability to generate
short-term profits may be hindered by political decisions through different channels.
In Models 3 and 4, we further classify foreign ownership into Arab investors and
non-Arab investors. Results show a negative and significant impact of both Arab and non-
Arab ownership on firm performance. Inconsistent with expectations, both types of foreign
ownership negatively influence firm performance. However, in terms of magnitude, the
negative coefficient on non-Arab ownership is almost double the size of that on Arab
ownership, suggesting that non-Arab ownership affects firm performance much more
negatively.
Various studies have documented the negative influence of foreign ownership on firm
performance (e.g. Bayrakdaroglu et al., 2012; Praptiningsih, 2009). Phung and Le (2013) note
similar results for firms in Vietnam and argue that foreign investors have lower ability to
monitor firms in emerging markets as they are not concentrated and suffer from information
asymmetry. This is qualitatively similar to UAE’s environment since its policy restricts
foreign investors from holding more than 49% in a company. This in turn deprives them of
the power to control the company and bring about change.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Institutional 0.059** 0.059** 0.050 0.056*
(1.991) (2.005) (1.602) (1.901)
Firm size 2.452** 2.443** 2.670** 2.946**
(2.006) (2.006) (2.131) (2.036)
Leverage 0.238*** 0.239*** 0.228*** 0.235***
(11.025) (11.049) (10.985) (11.312)
Independence 0.148 0.197 0.175 0.490
(0.614) (0.764) (0.787) (1.493)
Foreign 0.114 0.089
(1.177) (0.913)
Foreign * independence 0.045***
(4.564)
Arab ownership 15.900** 18.487**
(2.074) (2.286)
Non-Arab ownership 35.128** 24.135
(2.349) (1.488)
Arab * independence 13.439***
(4.376)
Non-Arab * independence 41.320***
(3.345)
Constant 9.497 9.647 9.911 12.220
(1.147) (1.159) (1.131) (1.205)
Observations 451 451 451 451
Number of groups 91 91 91 91
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note(s): The sample for this regression comprises 451 firm-year observations, representing listed firms on the
ADX and DFM over the period 2008–2012, for which data are available. The dependent variable is a firm’s
financial performance asmeasured by its return on assets. The key explanatory variable of interest is Arab and
Non-Arab ownership. Different regression specifications are used through the addition of interaction terms. All
regressions use firm and year fixed-effects. The symbols ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% level respectively
Table 5.







The negative influence of Arab and non-Arab foreign ownership on firm performance holds
for both ROA and ROI. However, the impact of board independence on this relationship is
significantly different for the two types of foreign ownership identities. Results in column 4
indicate that even when Arab ownership affects firm performance negatively on an average,
in the presence of a highly independent board, its negative influence on firm performance is
significantly reduced. We attribute this result to better cultural understanding and similarity
between Arab foreign investors and the Arab board members. Independent directors are
believed to help avoid wealth expropriation by concentrated ownership and improve
management decisions (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2006).
However, for non-Arab investors, in the presence of a highly independent board, the
impact on firm performance is worse, than without. This could mean that in the presence of
independent board members, non-Arab foreign investors who differ in their cultural
characteristics, language and beliefs, may lose ground as also, their ability to influence
positively, firm profitability. Thismight even cause the non-Arab foreign investors to dispose
their shareholding and leave the country, owing to persistent friction with independent board
members. Given the fact that board independence is one of the tools employed to monitor the
operations of the firm and protect the interests of minority shareholders, countries with low
investor protection might use corporate governance tools to enforce political agenda rather
than economic gain or increase shareholders’wealth. Ali (1995) argues that Arab states being
suspicious to foreign influences after the crises in the region.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Institutional 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.054** 0.060***
(2.860) (2.896) (2.401) (2.811)
Firm size 3.771*** 3.751*** 3.877*** 4.140***
(4.424) (4.287) (4.400) (3.516)
Leverage 0.228*** 0.229*** 0.223*** 0.233***
(13.095) (12.458) (13.881) (14.345)
Board independence 0.419 0.354 0.435 0.697*
(1.567) (1.184) (1.621) (1.706)
Foreign ownership 0.027 0.084**
(0.795) (2.503)
Foreign * independence 0.101***
(7.642)
Arab ownership 8.258** 7.475**
(2.036) (2.199)
Non-Arab ownership 11.948 1.274
(0.896) (0.086)
Arab * independence 8.701
(1.526)
Non-Arab * independence 50.967***
(3.457)
Constant 15.193** 15.527** 14.637** 17.077**
(2.401) (2.384) (2.227) (2.007)
Observations 451 451 451 451
Number of groups 91 91 91 91
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note(s): The sample for this regression comprises 451 firm-year observations, representing listed firms on the
ADX and DFM over the period 2008–2012, for which data are available. The dependent variable is a firm’s
financial performance as measured by its Return on Investment. The key explanatory variable of interest is
Arab and Non-Arab ownership. Different regression specifications are used through the addition of interaction
terms. All regressions use firm and year fixed-effects. The symbols ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% level respectively
Table 6.









Table 7 reports the results of regression analysis with firm social performance as the
dependent variable. As expected, we find a strong, positive coefficient on board
independence, indicating a positive impact of board independence on social performance
of the firm.
Hypothesis 3a stated that firms with foreign ownership exhibit greater social
performance. The estimated coefficients (β 5 0.034, p < 0.01; β 5 0.039, p < 0.01) for
foreign ownership are positive and significant in Model 1 and 2 respectively, indicating that
the higher levels of investment by foreign shareholders are related to enhanced social
performance.
This result implies that UAE companies with more foreign involvement display greater
social performance as proactive legitimacy strategy to satisfy foreign investors and to draw
more foreign capital. The finding is consistent with prior research (e.g R. M. Haniffa and
Cooke, 2005; Khan et al., 2013; McGuinness et al., 2017; Oh et al., 2011; Sukumara, 2017) that
suggests that foreign investors aremore familiarwith social issues and are thusmore likely to
exert pressure on domestic firms to adopt socially responsible practices to reduce uncertainty
and risk in the long-term.
We expected in hypothesis 3b that, relative to their counterparts, firms with non-Arab
foreign investors will display greater social performance. We find that the estimated
coefficients for non-Arab foreign ownership are positive and significant (β5 7.375, p < 0.01;
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Institutional 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.018***
(3.486) (3.543) (3.703) (3.789)
Firm size 0.067 0.065 0.027 0.084
(0.292) (0.282) (0.125) (0.399)
Leverage 0.006** 0.006** 0.008** 0.009**
(2.211) (2.212) (2.485) (2.605)
Board independence 0.748*** 0.815*** 0.754*** 0.828***
(3.431) (4.003) (3.509) (3.967)
Foreign ownership 0.034*** 0.039***
(3.128) (4.022)
Foreign * independence 0.009***
(4.130)
Arab foreign ownership 2.792 1.852
(1.304) (0.944)
Non-Arab ownership 7.375*** 9.282***
(3.961) (4.677)
Arab * independence 3.271***
(9.967)
Non-Arab * independence 6.970***
(22.829)
Constant 0.029 0.003 0.220 0.230
(0.022) (0.002) (0.168) (–0.172)
Observations 450 450 450 450
Number of groups 91 91 91 91
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note(s): The sample for this regression comprises 450 firm-year observations, representing listed firms on the
ADX and DFM over the period 2008–2012, for which data is available. The dependent variable is a firm’s social
performance as measured by the social performance index. The key explanatory variable of interest is Arab
and Non-Arab ownership. Different regression specifications are used through the addition of interaction
terms. All regressions use firm and year fixed-effects. The symbols ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% level respectively
Table 7.






β 5 9.282, p < 0.01) while the positive coefficients on Arab foreign ownership are not
statistically significant. This supports our conjecture.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to document such differential impact of Arab
and non-Arab ownership on social performance of the firm. This novel finding implies that
non-Arab foreign investors in the UAE are likely to promote and embrace social activities as
they have greater emphasis on CSR in their home countries. This is premised on the view that
foreign investors are more likely to support CSR activities if they are from countries with a
strong CSR culture (Dyck et al., 2017). Furthermore, non-Arab foreign investorsmay refer to a
company social performance as guide that can assist them inmaking investment decision due
to the significant information asymmetry. Having made their investment based on CSR
rating, non-Arab foreign shareholders may start place pressure on UAEmanagers to actively
adopt CSR practices and improve their firms’ social performance. Meutia et al. (2017) argued
that the demand for disclosure of information about the CSR activities by investors in
developing countries is not as strict as investors from developed nations.
Hypothesis 4 (a) predicts that board independence will impact the association between
foreign investors holding and CSR performance. To test this conjecture, we interacted foreign
ownership with board independence. As expected, we find a strong, positive coefficient on
board independence, indicating a positive impact of board independence on social
performance of the firm. This is consistent with prior studies that suggest independent
directors may feel that advocating investments in CSR activities is the best way to increase
the long-term sustainability of a firm (Ibrahim et al., 2003; Jizi et al., 2014), and thus
independent directors are more likely to be committed to CSR (Freeman, 1984).
However, the estimated coefficient (β 5 0.009, p < 0.01) for the interaction term is
negatively significant. This result offers support for the overinvestment hypothesis that
suggests thatmangers aremore inclined to overinvest in CSR opportunistically to gainmedia
coverage and to build their own reputation as good social citizens. Those managers who are
not closely monitored may abuse their power to obtain private benefits and not to promote
high ethical standards. The existence of independent directors on the board, who are
appointed by the managers, is less likely to curb overinvestment action of managers. The
negative coefficient can be interpreted as board independence acts as substitutable
mechanism for foreign ownership with regard to social performance. The result is in
congruent with prior researchers who found board independence can adversely influence
CSR performance (e.g.Hanniffa and Cook, 2005; Orti z-de-Mandojana, 2016).
In hypotheses 4b and c, we expected board independent to influence the impact of foreign
ownership identities on social performance. The interaction of board independence with non-
Arab and Arab foreign ownership were used to test our propositions. The estimated
coefficient (β 5 6.970, p < 0.01) for the interaction term between board independence and
non-Arab foreign ownership is significantly negative while it is positive and significant for
the interaction of board independence with Arab foreign ownership (β 5 3.271, p < 0.01).
The negative sign on the interaction term between board independence and non-Arab
foreign ownership reveals that when outside directors dominate the board the positive impact
of non-Arab foreign ownership on social performance is negatively attenuated. One possible
explanation might be most companies in UAE are dominated by family members who
concentrate on increasing their wealth and keeping control of the firms. Therefore, more
powerful familymembers are less likely to pay attention to the long-term sustainability of the
firms and to respond to their obligations to society. Given that outside directors are usually
elected by family members, it is expected that independent directors may collude with family
members to hide potential CSR opportunities from non-Arab foreign investors or they may
not exercise their power to ensure firms actively engage in CSR.
In contrast, the positive sign on the interaction term between board independence and






independent boards display greater social performance. This result could be explained by
Arab foreign investors’ religion and familiarity with UAE business environment. Arab
foreign investors might be aware of family members’ powerful position in the UAE
companies, and thus they may demand a right to have more representatives on board of
directors to reduce the risk that family members abuse their power. One other explanation is
that what is considered CSR activities for Arab investors might not be considered as such by
non-Arab investors – such as religious activities support or Quran citing activities – which
make the independent board members more understanding to Arab investors.
7. Further analysis
In the main results, we find that independent board members have a negative influence on
firms with non-Arab foreign ownership and a positive influence on firms with Arab foreign
ownership. We run our regressions again, but with domestic ownership instead. In Table 8,
we find that board independent has a positive influence on the impact of domestic ownership
on firm’s financial and social performance. This validates our argument that independent
board members do not get along with non-Arab foreign investors due to cultural, religious or
political reasons.
8. Conclusion
This paper addresses two very important questions which link UAE’s corporate governance
changing arrangements and its rapid increase in foreign investment with firm performance.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable ROA ROA ROI ROI Social Social
Institutional 0.059** 0.059** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.021*** 0.021***
(1.991) (2.005) (2.860) (2.896) (–3.486) (–3.543)
Size 2.452** 2.443** 3.771*** 3.751*** 0.067 0.065
(2.006) (2.006) (4.424) (4.287) (0.292) (0.282)
Leverage 0.238*** 0.239*** 0.228*** 0.229*** 0.006** 0.006**
(11.025) (11.049) (13.095) (12.458) (2.211) (2.212)
Domestic ownership 0.114 0.089 0.027 0.084** 0.034*** 0.039***
(1.177) (0.913) (0.795) (2.503) (3.128) (4.022)
Domestic* independence 0.045*** 0.101*** 0.009***
(4.564) (7.642) (4.130)
Independence 0.148 4.320*** 0.419 9.749*** 0.748*** 0.051
(–0.614) (–4.682) (–1.567) (–7.854) (3.431) (–0.134)
Constant 20.924 18.513 12.513** 7.121 3.412*** 3.873***
(1.437) (1.315) (2.115) (1.223) (3.423) (3.754)
Observations 451 451 451 451 450 450
Number of groups 91 91 91 91 91 91
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note(s): The sample for this regression comprises 450 firm-year observations, representing listed firms on the
ADX and DFM over the period 2008–2012, for which data are available. The dependent variable is a firm’s
financial performance as measured by its ROA and ROI, and social performance, as measured by the social
performance index. The key explanatory variable of interest is domestic ownership. Different regression
specifications are used through the addition of interaction terms. All regressions use firm and year fixed-
effects. The symbols ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively
Table 8.







First, has the recent support of more foreign investment led to an improvement in corporate
financial and social performance? Second, has the presence of independent board members
played a part in enhancing the financial and social performance of firms with foreign
investors? Previous studies found inconsistent results with regard to foreign ownership-firm
performance relationship and as a result some of these studies argue that only high
percentage of foreign ownership that matter. Others found high information asymmetry
impacts foreign ownership decision-making in emerging markets. We tickle the issue by
examining the identities of the foreign investors. We classified foreign ownership in the UAE
to ownership byArab foreign investors and non-Arab foreign investors.We then examine the
role of board independence in the relationship between these types of ownership and firm
financial and social performance.
Although we found consistent result on the impact of Arab and non-Arab foreign
investors on firm financial performance, results show different impact on the influence of
board independence in the relationship. High independent boards positively influence the
impact of Arab ownership and negatively influence the impact of non-Arab ownership on
firm financial and social performance. Our finding has a practical implication for foreign
investors that they should be aware of factors affecting firm performance such that of
professional and personal attributes of independent directors when making decisions to
invest in companies. Investors can be informed of the type of companies that contribute
toward CSR and show better performance. The findings of this study also send a signal for
policy makers to reexamine the factors that influence the appointment of independent
directors. Future research may study other corporate governance mechanisms with foreign
ownership in emerging markets. Future research can also examine deeper the role of board
independence in the UAE.
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